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KILLING "ZOMBIE DEBT" THROUGH
CLARITY AND CONSISTENCY IN THE FAIR
DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
Young Walgenkim'
INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, the debt collection industry has seen
astronomical growth.' It has grown from relatively small operations
to a multi-billion dollar industry. Such rapid growth, however, comes
at a cost. The uncanny success of some debt collectors stems in part
from the use of a variety of deceitful tactics in pursuit of an
increasing number of consumers. One particularly deceitful ploy is to
revive stale, paid-off, otherwise uncollectable debt, also known as
"Zombie Debt." In the wake of such tactics, there has been a steady
growth in consumer complaints.2 Here is one such story:
* J.D. candidate, May 2012, Willamette University College of Law. Many
thanks to my mentor, Greg Smith, for his relentless guidance, wisdom and
inspiration. Thanks also to my wife Sarah for her enduring love and support.
1 See, e.g., PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, INC., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM
10-K), at 8 (Feb. 25, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1185348/000095012311018695/w8O9O3elOvk.htm (showing one of the largest
debt collection companies boasting growth in annual revenue from $19.6 million in
2000 to $372.7 million in 2010, a compound annual growth rate of 34 percent).
2 Compare FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION
PRACTICES ACT 2 (2001), available at www.ftc.gov/os/2001/03/fdcpaar2000.pdf
(stating that nearly 14,000 consumer complaints were filed with the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") in 2000 in response to third-party collection attempts), with
FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 2011: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES
ACT 5 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 FTC ANNUAL REPORT], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110321fairdebtcollectreport.pdf (showing a total of
140,036 consumer complaints filed in 2010, an almost tenfold increase in
complaints from 2000); see also infra Figure 1. The debt collection industry has
also seen an increase in the civil penalties imposed against third-party collectors.
See, e.g., 2011 FTC ANNUAL REPORT, supra, at 11 & n.30 (discussing United
States v. West Asset Mgmt., Inc., No. 1-11 -CV-0746 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2011),
where a settlement agreement of $2.8 million was announced, the largest civil
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Debbie's Story3
Debbie is a single mother of two with a prior history of credit
difficulties. It has been over five years since she paid off the last of
her delinquent credit card debts.
One day she receives a collection letter from the Law Office
of Harold Simmons, claiming she owes money on an account with
Evermore Funding. Debbie has never had an account with Evermore
Funding. She calls Harold's number provided on his letterhead, but
she only hears a pre-recorded message.
A few days later, Debbie starts getting nasty phone calls from
Harold's law office. She writes a letter to Harold requesting that he
verify the debt. A few days later, Harold replies, confirming the
validity of the debt by the unknown Evermore Funding. The letter
contains no contract, receipt, or any other document pertaining to the
account. It merely states that "Evermore Funding has confirmed the
validity of your debt."4
A month later, Debbie receives a complaint and summons in
the mail requesting her appearance in court. Wanting to avoid stress,
Debbie puts away the documents and forgets about them.s Soon, the
penalty ever issued by the FTC, with the previous largest settlement being $2.25
million.); see also id. at 12-13 ("In October 2010, the FTC reached a settlement
agreement with collector Allied Interstate, Inc. ("Allied"), one of the nation's
largest debt collectors.. .Under the settlement agreement, Allied paid a $1.75
million civil penalty and agreed to stop collection efforts on disputed debts in the
future unless and until it conducts a reasonable investigation and verifies the
debt.").
3 The following text contains a hypothetical story derived from real life events
as described in ROBERT J. HOBBS, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, FAIR DEBT
COLLECTION § 1.5.4.5 (6th ed. 2008) ("NCLC [National Consumer Law Center]
has heard of cases where the consumer thought they paid off the debt in response to
a settlement offer from the debt buyer, only for the debt to surface months later in
the hands of another debt buyer seeking payment for the old balance all over
again."). All of the characters in this story are fictitious.
4 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (2006) (requiring a debt collector to provide
verification of a debt if it is requested within 30 days of the debtor receiving a
validation notice); see also infra Part II.a.ii-iii.
5 The FTC provides several additional reasons why a debtor may not appear in
court. JON LEIBOWITZ ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM:
PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 12
n.39 (2010) [hereinafter FTC ROUNDTABLE], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/07/debtcollectionreport.pdf (providing the following
reasons for a debtor failing to attend a court hearing: not recognizing the entity
suing them, believing it's a case of mistaken identity, fear and unfamiliarity, lack of
legal representation, misunderstanding the summons, housing emergencies, and
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court enters a default judgment against her. She then learns her bank
account and paychecks are being garnished. She loses all the money
in her bank account, and her remaining paycheck is no longer
sufficient to support her family.
Unbeknownst to Debbie, she is being garnished for a debt that
she has already paid off - a zombie debt. The debt being claimed was
for a defaulted MegaBank credit card, which she settled with another
debt collector five years ago. Due to a clerical error, Debbie's paid-
off account was sold to Evermore Funding. As a large-scale debt
buyer, Evermore purchased the debt along with thousands of other
defaulted loans on the secondary market for pennies on the dollar.6
Had Debbie been informed that MegaBank was the creditor,
she would have been able to avoid garnishment by hiring an attorney
or providing the debt collector with confirmation of her previous
settlement.
Harold's Story7
Harold Simmons is an attorney that represents national debt
buyers like Evermore Funding. He receives thousands of new
accounts every month from these clients. Such accounts are often
defaulted debts, having been charged off by original creditors like
MegaBank several years previously. They come with very little
information, frequently lacking any contracts, charge slips, or credit
applications. Sometimes Harold only receives a spreadsheet with
minimal information about the debtor or the debt itself.9 The
lack of transportation).
6 See HOBBS, supra note 3, § 1.5.4.1 (citing Scally v. Hilco Receivables, LLC,
392 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (N.D. Ill. 2005), where a debt buyer paid ten cents on the
dollar for bank credit accounts) ("In recent years hundreds of collection agencies
have sprung up that purchase consumer debts, most often banks' credit card debts
which have been written off by the originator, and usually only pay pennies on the
dollar for the debt while seeking to collect the full debt."); see also ENCORE
CAPITAL GROUP, INC., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), at 1 (Feb. 14, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1084961/0001193125110352
93/dl0k.htm. (showing a debt collector reporting purchasing debts worth up to
$54.7 billion for about $1.8 billion, a purchase approximately at three cents on the
dollar).
7 See HOBBS, supra note 3.
8 See id. § 1.5.4.5.
9 See WILLIAM E. KOVAVIC ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM'N, COLLECTING
CONSUMER DEBTS: THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE 22 (2009) [hereinafter FTC
WORKSHOP REPORT], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/debtcollection/dcwr.pdf ("An attorney who
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difficulties associated with the collection of these accounts are offset
by the 30 Percent contingency fee Harold charges on every dollar
recovered Such claims are often invalid."
Harold knows that the best way to be profitable is to qet as
many claims to judgment as quickly and easily as possible.' The
goal for Harold is to get an uncontested default judgment, which will
give him the power to garnish the debtor's bank accounts and
paychecks, regardless of the validity of the debt.13 If the debtor does
appear to contest the claim, Harold often decides to withdraw, and
voluntarily dismiss the case. He figures the relatively low value of
the claim would not be worth his time. 14
represents consumers in actions against debt collectors reported that debt buyers
she had encountered receive only an electronic spreadsheet that contains the
consumer's name, Social Security number, last known address, charge-off date, the
amount owed, date and amount of last payment when they purchase account
portfolios.") (internal citations omitted), reviewed by NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW
CENTER & NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES, COMMENTS TO
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REGARDING THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION
PRACTICES ACT 27-28 (June 6, 2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comnents/debtcollectionworkshop/529233-00018.pdf
(agreeing with the FTC that debt collectors should be required to possess certain
basic information about debtors prior to collection attempts).
10 See HOBBS, supra note 3, § 1.5.3 ("The lawyer typically would be retained
on a contingent fee basis, retaining a portion, e.g., 15-50%, of any amount
collected.").
I See HOBBS, supra note 3, § 1.5.4.4 ("[The] NCLC has heard of all sorts of
flaws in the debt buyers' claims. Some of the claims have already been paid, others
were someone else's debt, and some were created by an identity thief. Others are
beyond the statute of limitations, were discharged with the original credit card
company years before by the consumer for fraud, nonperformance, or another
problem.").
12 In New York City, debt collection suits almost outnumbered all other civil
and criminal suits filed in U.S. federal courts combined in 2010. HOBBS, supra note
3, § 1.5.4.3. One law firm consisting of 14 attorneys is reported to, on average, file
nearly 80,000 lawsuits a year. Andrew Martin, Automated Debt-Collection
Lawsuits Engulf Courts, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/business/I3collection.html.
1 See HOBBS, supra note 3, § 1.5.4.4 ("By getting a small claims default
judgment...the debt buyer no longer has to worry too much about consumer
defenses that would weaken its claim if it were scrutinized and can proceed with
obtaining a payment order, attachment or garnishment forcing the consumer to pay
its claim whether it was valid or not.").
14 One debtor defense attorney in Oregon reports that when he appears to
defend the case, the debt collector often withdraws and voluntarily seeks dismissal.
Telephone Interview with Bret Knewston, Attorney, Law Office of Bret Knewston
(Sep. 29, 2011).
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His advantage is that debtors are often people, who ignore
their problems. They will likely fail to show up to court, allowing
him an uncontested default judgment.' 5 In fact, Harold has
discovered that contested judgments are rare when debtors are
confused as to the nature of the debt bein claimed; such uncertainty
encourages their tendencies to do nothing.
His hurdles are the strict reuirements of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").' Under the FDCPA, debtors
like Debbie have 30 days from the date of the validation notice to
dispute the debt and seek verification.' 8 So, although the FDCPA
requires Harold to name the creditor (i.e. MegaBank) in his collection
letters (or demand letters),' 9 he formulates a tactic to confuse the
debtors. He names his debt collector client, Evermore Funding, as the
creditor. He also sends the debtors' requests for verification to
Evermore Funding.
Harold's tactic works. Debbie did not recognize Harold's debt
collector client. She did not know she had previously paid off the
debt. Therefore she did not dispute the debt. She requested
verification, but since it never reached the original creditor
(MegaBank), it was ineffective, Ultimately, Harold and Evermore
obtained a judgment against Debbie and initiated garnishment of her
wages and bank accounts.
Unfortunately, Debbie's story is common in the debt
collection world. Although debtors face a large variety of abuses
stemming from many different misapplications of the FDCPA, one
major issue stands out above others: incorrectly applying the
statutory definitions of creditor and debt collector. By routinely
misapplying these terms, debt collectors have created confusion
among debtors, obtained erroneous rulings in the courts, and opened
the door to further encroachment on the rights of debtors granted by
the FDCPA.
Part I of this article looks at how the terms 'creditor' and
'debt collector' are defined in the FDCPA and interpreted by the
courts, while exploring the legislative intent behind those definitions.
Part II discusses how incorrectly applying the two terms effectively
15 Some debt collection experts estimate about 60 to 95 percent of debt
collection lawsuits result in default judgments, with many of these experts
estimating closer to 90 percent. See, e.g. FTC ROUNDTABLE, supra note 5, at 5.
16 Debt collectors often seek continuances or dismissals once they discover that
the debtor intends to appear in court. See id. at 21.
" See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2006).
18 See infra Part II.a.ii-iii.
19 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2).
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robs debtors of their rights granted by the FDCPA. Part III of this
article examines common arguments debt collectors raise to muddy
the waters. Finally, Part IV provides recommendations to resolve the
problems arising from inconsistent application of the two terms.
I. FDCPA DEFINITIONS: CREDITOR VS. DEBT COLLECTOR
Nationwide debt collection enforcement started in 1977, when
Congress enacted the FDCPA to curb a "host of unfair, harassing,
and deceptive debt collection practices without imposing unnecessary
restrictions on ethical debt collectors." 20 One of the purposes of the
act was to "eliminate the recurring problem of debt collectors
dunning21 the wrong person or attempting to collect debts that the
consumer has already paid." 22 The scope of the Act was to regulate
only debt collectors and not creditors because "[u]nlike creditors,
who generally are restrained by the desire to protect their goodwill
when collecting past-due accounts, independent [debt] collectors are
likely to have no future contact with the consumer and often are
unconcerned with the consumer's opinion of them."23
Often the creditor who extended the credit attempts to collect
the debt by hiring a debt collector. In these cases, it is simple to
determine who is liable under the FDCPA because there is only one
debt collector and one creditor. When the creditor, however, sells a
defaulted obligation to a debt buyer (like Evermore Funding), who in
turn hires others to collect the debt, the distinction between creditor
and debt collector can get murky. These debt purchasers frequently
attempt to escape liability under the FDCPA by falsely claiming to be
creditors.
In fact, regarding any single obligation, creditors cannot be
debt collectors and debt collectors cannot be creditors. The FDCPA
defines the terms to be mutually exclusive.
a. Statutory Definition of 'creditor' and 'debt collector'
Congress sought to exclude creditors from liability under
FDCPA with a bright line distinction between creditor and debt
collector. 24 The FDCPA defines creditor as follows:
20 S. REP. No. 95-382, at 1 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696.
21 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 577 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "dun" as a verb
meaning "[t]o demand payment from (a delinquent debtor).").
22 S. REP. No. 95-382, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696.
23 Id. at 2.
24 See id. at 4.
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The term "creditor" means any person who offers or
extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed,
but such term does not include any person to the extent that
he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default
solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt
for another.25
The FDCPA defines debt collector as follows:
The term "debt collector" means any person who uses any
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any
business the principal purpose of which is the collection of
any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect,
directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be
26
owed or due another...
b. The Two Terms are Mutually Exclusive
"For purposes of applying the [FDCPA] to a particular debt,
these two categories-debt collectors and creditors-are mutually
exclusive." 27 Courts have followed this reading of the statute
unanimously. 28 Consequently, for any given obligation a creditor
cannot be a debt collector, and a debt collector cannot be a creditor
under the FDCPA.29
c. Post-Default Purchaser = Debt Collector
Under the FDCPA, distinguishing debt collectors from
creditors is readily done by determining when the entity came into
possession of the obligation. Obtaining an obligation before default
(i.e. as an original creditor extending credit for a consumer
transaction or purchasing from an original creditor before default)
entitles one to creditor status and exclusion from the applicability of
25 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4) (2006).
26 Id. § 1692a(6).
27 Schlosser v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 323 F.3d 534, 536 (7th Cir. 2002).
28 See id. at 536; see also F.T.C. v. Check Investors, 502 F.3d 159, 173 (3d Cir.
2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 569 (2008) ("However, as to a specific debt, one
cannot be both a creditor and a 'debt collector' as defined in the FDCPA, because
those terms are mutually exclusive.").
29 Notwithstanding one exception: "[A]ny creditor who, in the process of
collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate
that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts." 15 U.S.C. §
1692(6). This exception is not relevant for the purposes of this inquiry.
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the FDCPA. On the other hand, obtaining an obligation after it has
gone into default always confers the status of debt collector along
with the burdens and obligations of the FDCPA.30
Since the FDCPA does not define when a debt is in default,
courts often allow the parties to determine the date of default in the
contract. 3 1 Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "default" as "the
omission or failure to perform a legal or contractual duty; esp., the
failure to pay a debt when due." A definite way to determine
whether an account was in default when it was sold is to look at the
charge-off or write-off date. When a debt is charged off,3 3 it is no
longer considered an asset of value on the creditor's books, allowing
the creditor to treat it as a loss to offset its taxable income. 34 The
creditor then may continue to try to collect the debt or sell it to a debt
buyer. Since the debt portfolios that debt buyers receive often include
the charge-off date, the information is readily available for the
30 See, e.g., Ruth v. Triumph P'ships, 577 F.3d 790, 797 (7th Cir. 2009)
("[T]he party seeking to collect a debt did not originate it but instead acquired it
from another party, we have held that the party's status under the FDCPA turns on
whether the debt was in default at the time it was acquired."); McKinney v.
Cadleway Props., 548 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he purchaser of a debt in
default is a debt collector for purposes of the FDCPA even though it owns the debt
and is collecting for itself."); Schlosser, 323 F.3d at 536 ("[T]he Act treats
assignees as debt collectors if the debt sought to be collected was in default when
acquired by the assignee, and as creditors if it was not."); Check Investors, 502
F.3d at 173 ("[O]ne attempting to collect a debt is a debt collector under
the FDCPA if the debt in question was in default when acquired."); Pollice v. Nat'l
Tax Funding, LP, 225 F.3d 379, 403-04 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[An assignee of an
obligation is not a debt collector if the obligation is not in default at the time of the
assignment; conversely, an assignee may be deemed a debt collector if the
obligation is already in default when it is assigned."); Perry v. Stewart Title Co.,
756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[A] debt collector does not include ... an
assignee of a debt, as long as the debt was not in default at the time it was
assigned."); Wadlington v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 76 F.3d 103, 106 (6th Cir.
1996); Alibrandi v. Fin. Outsourcing Servs., Inc., 333 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2003)
("[C]lassification of debt collector depends upon the status of a debt, rather than the
type of collection activities used.").
31 See Alibrandi, 333 F.3d at 86; see also Prince v. NCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 346
F. Supp. 2d 744, 747 (E.D. Pa. 2004); Hartman v. Meridian Fin. Servs., Inc., 191 F.
Supp. 2d 1031, 1043 (W.D. Wis. 2002).
32 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 480 (9th ed. 2009).
3 A closed-end credit, such as car loans, must be charged off after 120 days of
consecutive delinquency, and an open-end credit, such as credit cards, must be
charged off after 180 days of consecutive delinquency. Uniform Retail Credit
Classification and Account Management Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. 36904 (June 12,
2000).
34 See HOBBS, supra note 3, § 1.5.12.
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attorney-debt collector to determine whether the debt buyer is a
'creditor' or a 'debt collector.' Although the debt may have been in
default earlier than the charge-off date (depending on the parties'
contract) a debt buyer who acquired the debt after the charge-off date
would undoubtedly be a debt collector, and not a creditor.
MegaBank extended the credit that created Debbie's debt and
is therefore a creditor. Evermore bought the debt after Debbie
supposedly defaulted, and is therefore a debt collector. Harold is also
a debt collector because he is attempting to collect on defaulted debt
as an agent of Evermore Funding. Nevertheless, debt collectors like
Evermore frequently claim they are creditors in order to escape the
applicability and consequences of the FDCPA.
II. WHY THE CREDITOR/DEBT COLLECTOR DISTINCTION IS
So IMPORTANT
Failure to insist on a rigorous and consistent application of the
definitions of creditor and debt collector can lead to many serious
abuses in debt collection practice, resulting in numerous
infringements upon debtors' rights. Since creditors are not liable
under the FDCPA, debt collectors sometimes attempt to escape
liability altogether by falsely claiming to be creditors.3 More
commonly, however, debt collectors use the misapplication of the
terms to create confusion in the validation notice.
a. Debtors' Rights in the Validation Notice
One of the primary obligations for attorney debt collectors
like Harold under the FDCPA is to inform the debtors of their rights
by sending a validation notice. The FDCPA requires all debt
collectors to send a written notice within five days of the first contact
3 See S. REP. No. 95-382, at 2 (1977) reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695,
1696; see also Russell-Allgood v. Resurgent Capital Servs., L.P., 515 F. Supp. 2d
1307, 1310 (N.D. Ga. June 6, 2007), vacated, (June 26, 2007). In Russell-Allgood,
the court dismissed a claim against LVNV, an entity that purchases defaulted debts,
by finding it to be a creditor. The opinion correctly referred to the FDCPA's
statutory definitions of creditor and debt collector, but wrongly labeled a debt
collector as a creditor. Although the Court established that LVNV purchased the
debt after default, it inexplicably assumed that since LVNV owned the debt, it was
a creditor. Consequently, a debt collector who purchased an obligation after default
almost escaped responsibility by falsely claiming creditor status. Although the
judgment in Russell-Allgood was eventually vacated, it serves as a reminder that
such careless analysis continues to threaten the consistency of the definitions of
creditor and debt collector under the FDCPA.
732011]
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with a debtor.36
Since the FDCPA is a strict liability statute, the validation
notice triggers strict liability duties for the debt collector.3 7 Thus, a
debt collector who fails to meet any part of the validation
requirements is subject to liability even if the violation was
unintentional and the consumer did not suffer any damages. 38 The
validation notice grants five rights to the debtor under the FDCPA:
1. Right to know the amount of the debt, 39
2. Right to know who the creditor is,40
3. Right to dispute the debt,41
4. Right to request verification,42 and
5. Right to know who the original creditor is.43
Debt collectors erode four of these rights by falsely applying
the creditor status.4
i. Right to Know Who the Creditor Is
Validation notices must contain "the name of the creditor to
whom the debt is owed."4 5 Proper identification of the creditor
(usually the bank that issued the credit card or the car loan) prevents
debt collectors from "dunning the wrong person or attempting to
collect debts which the consumer has already paid."4 6 While Debbie
did not recognize the obscure debt buyer/collector that currently
36 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2006).
37 See id. § 1692k(a); see also Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Lamar, 503
F.3d 504, 513 (6th Cir. 2007) ("Courts have characterized the FDCPA as a strict
liability statute, meaning that a consumer may recover statutory damages if the debt
collector violates the FDCPA even if the consumer suffered no actual damages.");
Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1121-22 & n.15 (10th Cir. 2002) ("Many other
courts, although not squarely addressing the clerical/legal mistake issue, have
stated that the FDCPA is a strict liability statute."); Clark v. Capital Credit &
Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1175 (9th Cir. 2006) [hereinafter Clark 2];
Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 2004); Picht v. John R.
Hawks, Ltd., 236 F.3d 446,451 (8th Cir. 2001).
38 See Lamar, 503 F.3d at 513.
39 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1).
40 Id. § 1692g(a)(2).
41 Id. § 1692g(a)(3).
42 Id. § 1692g(a)(4).
43 Id. § 1692g(a)(5).
4 Although the right to know the amount of the debt is very important, it is not
relevant to our discussion because it is not affected by incorrectly labeling a debt
collector a creditor.
45 Id. § 1692g(a)(2).
46 S. REP. No. 95-382, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1697.
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holds her obligation, she knew her credit card came from MegaBank.
Had she known the identity of the creditor, she would have known
that Harold's collection attempt was for a paid-off debt, ultimately
avoiding the consequence of an improper judgment and garnishment.
ii. Right to Dispute the Debt
Validation notices must contain "a statement that unless the
consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the
validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed
to be valid by the debt collector." 47
This provision gives the debtor a right to dispute the debt
within 30 days of receiving the validation notice. However, when
debtors do not recognize the creditor on the validation notice, they
often ignore it thinking it is a scam or a mistake.48 By doing nothing
for 30 days, debtors waive their right to dispute the debt with the debt
collector.4 9 Debt collectors achieve this "waiver" by creating enough
confusion in the debtor by obscuring the definition of creditor and
"debt collector."
iii. Right to Request Verification50
Validation notices must contain "a statement that if the
consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day
period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt
collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment
against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will
47 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3).
48 See Interview with Greg Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Or.
Dep't of Justice, in Salem, Or. (Sep. 28, 2011) ("[The] Oregon Department of
Justice frequently receives complaints from consumers who say they don't owe the
debt because they never had a credit card with [the company named as the creditor
on the validation notice]. Some even claim that these are 'scams' that are trying to
get them to pay money they don't owe.").
49 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3). It should be noted that debtors may never fully
waive their right to dispute the debt because debt collectors have a legal obligation
to possess information supporting the validity of the debts they attempt to collect.
See FTC WORKSHOP REPORT, supra note 9, at 24.
50 To clarify, in the FDCPA, the term validation is used to refer to the notice
informing the debtors of their rights. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). Verification, on the
other hand, is the process by which the debt collector must confirm that the debt is
in fact collectible. Id. § 1692g(a)(4). Although these terms are often used
interchangeably, to minimize confusion debtors should request verification of the
validity of the debt.
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be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector."5 1
In Clark v. Capital Credit (Clark 2), the Ninth Circuit
explained the verification requirement by accepting the Fourth
Circuit's standard for verification as articulated in Chaudhry v.
Gallerizzo,52 where verification of a debt involves nothing more than
the debt collector confirming in writing that the amount being
demanded is what the creditor claims is owed.
Applying the Chaudhry standard to the language of the
FDCPA, a debt collector must at least meet the following
requirements:
1. contact the creditor,54
2. obtain a written verification from the creditor " and
3. mail a copy of the verification to the debtor.
The court reasoned that "[n]o provision of the FDCPA has
been found which would require a debt collector independently to
investigate the merit of the debt, except to obtain verification.. . or to
51 Id. § 1692g(a)(4); see also id. § 1692g(b) ("If the consumer notifies the debt
collector in writing within the thirty-day period described in subsection (a) that the
debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and
address of the original creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt,
or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the
debt or any copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original creditor,
and a copy of such verification or judgment, or name and address of the original
creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector . . . .").
52 Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1173-
74 (9th Cir. 2006) [hereinafter Clark 2] (citing Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d
394 (4th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 891, 120 S. Ct. 215 (1999)).
5 Id. Even though Chaudhry states that "[v]erification only requires a debt
collector to confirm with his client that a particular amount is actually being
claimed," the rule is consistent with the language of the FDCPA requiring
verification of the debt with the creditor. Chaudrhy, 174 F.3d at 406.
54 See Chaudhry, 174 F.3d at 406 ("[V]erification of debt involves nothing
more than the debt collector confirming in writing that the amount being demanded
is what the creditor is claiming is owed.") (emphasis added); see also Clark 2, 460
F.3d at 1173-74; Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 498 (7th Cir. 1997) (inserting
"from the creditor" into 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4)) ("[T]he debt collector will obtain
verification of the debt [from the creditor]. . .") (brackets in original)..
" 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) ("[T]he debt collector will obtain verification of the
debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer. . . ."); Id. § 1692g(b) ("[T]he
debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof,
until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt. . .").
s61d § 1692g(a)(4) ("[A] copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed
to the consumer by the debt collector"); Id. § 1692g(b) ("[A]nd a copy of such
verification or judgment... is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.").
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keep detailed files."5 The FDCPA makes a consistent bright line
distinction between debt collectors and creditors. Since debt buyer
clients (being debt collectors themselves) are not required to keep
detailed files, they cannot adequately verify the debt. 5 8 Requesting
verification from these debt buyer clients therefore would not
"eliminate the problem of [a] debt collector attempting to collect a
debt that has already been paid." 59 Such practices are contrary to both
legislative intent and the explicit requirements of the statute.
Many debt collectors wrongly verify debts with their debt
buyer clients rather than with the creditor as required.60 Since neither
Evermore nor Harold are creditors, they cannot verify the debt among
themselves. Verification must come from the creditor (i.e.
MegaBank). If Harold had properly sought verification from the
creditor (MegaBank), Debbie, Harold, and Evermore would have
quickly learned the debt had been paid off. No improper judgment or
garnishment would have occurred.
iv. Right to Know Who the Original Creditor Is
The fifth right of the validation notice allows the debtor to
request within 30 days the name of the original creditor if different
from the current creditor.6 1 This right to request information about
the original creditor only applies when the current creditor is different
from the original creditor. The only time this situation arises is when
the obligation is sold before default. If the obligation was sold after
default, then the buyer is a debt collector. In such a case, there is only
one creditor. However, debt collectors who have purchased the debt
5 Azar v. Hayter, 874 F. Supp. 1314, 1317 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (emphasis added).
58 See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-748, CREDIT CARDS:
FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT COULD BETIER REFLECT THE EVOLVING
DEBT COLLECTION MARKETPLACE AND USE OF TECHNOLOGY 43 (2009), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09748.pdf ("According to FTC and other
stakeholders, collection agencies and debt buyers sometimes may not have
adequate information about their accounts and may not always have access to
documentation needed to verify the debt.").
' S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699.
60 Frequently the "verification" that debtors receive only contains one
paragraph showing the amount owed, the account number, and the owner of the
debt. The debt collector for the above debt admits that it only checks its own
records before sending that one paragraph verification letter.
61 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a)(5) (Validation notices must contain "a statement that,
upon the consumer's written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector
will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if
different from the current creditor.").
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after default persistently attempt to label themselves as current
creditors. 62
Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Services (Clark 1) shows
the error of such an approach and helps illustrate the Congressional
intent behind this provision. 63 Plaintiff was being billed for medical
treatment from a retired physician, Dr. Sullivan. Before default had
occurred, Dr. Sullivan sold his business - including the accounts
receivable - to Dr. Evans. After failing to collect from Clark, Dr.
Evans assigned the debt to Capital Credit & Collection Services.
Then Capital Credit retained an attorney, Hasson, to collect the
debt. 4 Hasson sent a demand letter (validation notice) to Clark
naming Dr. Evans as the creditor. Clark sued Capital Credit alleging
that, among other things, Hasson's validation notice violated the
FDCPA because it listed the wrong creditor. The court noted the
statutory definitions of creditor and debt collector and identified Dr.
.Evans as the correct current creditor because she had purchased the
*debt before it was in default. 65 According to this reasoning, the
correct labels under the FDCPA as applied to Clark 1 and our
scenario are as follows:
Original Current Debt Debt Debtor
Creditor Creditor Collector Collector
Clark v. Dr.Dr.Evans(Attorney)
Clark v. Dr. Dr. Evans a Capital Hasson Clark
Capital Sullivan W Credit
Credit
Debbie MegaBank MegaBank Evermore Harold Debbie
v. Funding
Harold
62 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Affiliated Group, No. 04CV4467, 2006 WL 83474,
at *1 (E.D. N.Y. Jan. 12, 2006). In Hernandez, the court, misapplying the definition
of creditor, held that the debt collector did not violate the FDCPA when he named
the owner of the debt (who acquired it in default) and failed to name the original
creditor, who was the only entity that fit the definition of creditor. Id. at *4; see
also infra Part III.a.i. Hernandez has not been overturned, even though this
application of the definition of "creditor" is inconsistent with the governing law in
its circuit (the Second Circuit). See Alibrandi, 333 F.3d at 86 ("Thus, under §
1692a(6)(F)(iii), the classification of debt collector depends upon.the status of a
debt, rather than the type of collection activities used.").
6 See generally Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Serv., Inc., No. Civ. 03-
340-JE, 2004 WL 1305326 (D. Or. Jan. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Clark 1], rev'd on
other grounds, 460 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2006).
6 Id. at *1.
6 Id. at *11.
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Therefore, original creditor/current creditor status under 15
U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5) only applies when there are multiple and
sequential creditors - each of whom acquired the debt before default.
By intentionally misidentifying themselves as creditors in
validation notices, debt collectors confuse debtors and burn through.
the 30-day window. After the 30 days have passed, debtors lose their
rights to dispute the debt with the debt collector and to obtain
verification. 6 Those rights flow directly from the right to know the
identity of the creditor.
As Debbie's story illustrates, Harold's failure to identify
MegaBank as the creditor results in her failing to avail herself of the
protections of the FDCPA. Early and accurate verification avoids
judicial inefficiencies and injustices such as judgments and
garnishments on zombie debts.
b. Current Practices - the FDCPA is Not Being
Consistently Applied
All too frequently, attorney-debt collectors like Harold
routinely send demand letters (validation notices) that identify only
the debt collectors - omitting any reference to the entity the debtor
would recognize: the creditor. These debt collectors (defaulted debt
buyers) routinely continue to falsely claim creditor status by often
relying on poorly reasoned cases.
One example of such a case is York Gee Au Chan v. North
American Collectors.6 7 In this case, the debtor, Chan, alleged that
North American Collectors violated the FDCPA by sending him a
demand letter that named Citibank as the creditor. The court denied
the defendant's motion to dismiss, claiming that since Citibank had
sold the debt to Unifund CCR Partners, the defendant should have
69
named Unifund CCR as the current creditor on the account.
Although North American Collectors had actually correctly named
Citibank as the creditor according to the FDCPA's definition, the
court itself confused the definitions of creditor and debt collector. 70
The court apparently reached that decision by relying on its own
understanding of the term 'creditor' instead of consulting the statute.
66 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
67 York Gee Au Chan v. N. Am. Collectors, Inc., No. C 06-0016 JL, 2006 WL
778642 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2006).
61 Id. at * 1.
69 Id. at *3.
70 id.
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In another case, Hepsen v. J. C. Christensen & Associates,7 1
the defaulted debt buyer, LVNV Funding, LLC ("LVNV"),
contracted with another debt collector, Resurgent Capital Services,
Inc. ("Resurgent"), who in turn hired an attorney debt collector, J.C.
Christensen & Associates. 72 Instead of properly identifying the bank
that issued the credit card, Providian National Bank, as the creditor in
the validation notice, the attorney only identified the debt collector
Resurgent. 73 At trial, even though it was established that the
obligation was in default at the time of LVNV's purchase, the court
held LVNV to be a creditor by the mere fact that it was the current
owner of the debt. 74
Such inconsistent and incorrect application of the definition of
creditor in the context of the validation notice is a common problem
in the debt collection industry.7 5 Debt collectors frequently rely on
these erroneous sources to the detriment of the debtors and
sometimes of themselves. 76
Proper validation notices that correctly identify the creditor fix
this problem (and conform to the FDCPA) because they "guarantee
that consumers . .. receive adequate notice of their legal rights." 7
The purpose of this right is not to know to whom the debtor must
write a check or where the payment will go, but it is to "eliminate the
7 Hepsen v. J.C. Christensen & Assocs., Inc., No. 8:07-CV-1935-T-EAJ, 2009
WL 3064865 at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2009), aff'd, 383 F. App'x. 877 (11th Cir.
2010).
72 Actually, Providian National Bank first sold the debt to OSI/Gulf State
Credit, who in turn sold to LVNV. Id.
7 See generally id.
74 Id. at *4 ("It is undisputed that Christensen identified Resurgent as the
creditor in its dunning letter to Hepsen when, in fact, at the time of the October 27,
2006 letter to Hepsen, the current creditor was LVNV. This was a false
representation. A creditor is 'any person who offers or extends credit creating a
debt or to whom a debt is owed,' but such term does not include debt collectors. 15
U.S.C. § 1692a(4). By using the name of its client in the demand letter, rather than
LVNV as the creditor on Hepsen's account, Christensen violated § 1692e(10).");
see also Brief for Appellee at 22, J.C. Christensen and Assoc. v. Hepsen, No. 19-
15435-A, 2010 WL 687667 (11th Cir. 2010).
7 See, e.g., 10 WEST'S PA. FORMS, DEBTOR-CREDrrOR § 5.11 ("We are writing
to notify you that we have been instructed by our client, [Creditor], to prepare a
law suit against you."). This form letter implies that the field "[Creditor]" is the
same as that of an attorney's client. The formbook does not address any
modification when the client is a debt buyer and not a creditor.
76 See, e.g., Hepsen, 383 F. App'x. 877 (addressing a case where the attorney
debt collector, who was ultimately held liable for naming the wrong creditor, had
his validation notice approved by the American Collection Association).
77 Miller v. Payco Gen. Am. Creditors, 943 F.2d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1991).
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recurring problem of debt collectors dunning the wrong person or
attempting to collect debts which the consumer has already paid."78
In other words, the validation notice was intended to provide actual
notice to the debtor of the nature of the debt by naming the creditor.
Usually debtors have more than one account that has gone to
collections, and the debt may be several years old.7 9 As a result,
debtors may not remember the debt, especially if the validation notice
names an unknown debt collector as the creditor.80 Sometimes
debtors assume the collection efforts are fraudulent or mere mistakes,
ignoring the notices altogether, and believing that nothing will
happen to them. Such an action is reasonable given that debt
collectors frequently call wrong phone numbers and send letters to
incorrect addresses because they receive scant and dubious
information about the debt from their debt buyer clients. 82
Attorney-debt collectors count on such attitudes to get quick
default judgments, knowing that by confusing debtors, they are not
likely to show up to court.8 3 Congress intended to curb such behavior
and eliminate these errors by requiring validation notices that actually
notify the debtor of the nature of the debt by naming the creditor. A
misuse of the statutory definition of creditor and debt collector,
however, denies this significant statutory right to the consumer.
S. REP. No. 95-382, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699.
7 See HOBBS, supra note 3, §1.5.4.3 ("A major debt-buyer reports a five-year
and longer time frame for collection of its purchased debts, meaning that
financially distressed families will hear from them again and again for a
demoralizing five or ten years, long after the jeans or toaster oven they purchased
has worn out.") (citing ASSET ACCEPTANCE CAPITAL CORP., ANNUAL REPORT
(FORM 10-K) (Mar. 21, 2005) at 2, 29); see also Johnson v. Midland Credit Mgmt.,
No. 1:05 CV 1094, 2006 WL 2473004 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (debt buyer collecting on
a 14 year-old and a 20 year-old account).
80 Interview with Greg Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Or. Dep't of
Justice, in Salem, Or. (Sep. 28, 2011) ("Based on our investigations into debt
collectors Oregon DOJ has seen a national pattern of debt buyers consistently and
wrongfully identifying themselves as creditors on validation notices for defaulted
consumer loans when they are, in fact, debt collectors. By wrongfully
misrepresenting themselves, they confuse debtors thus making them more likely to
consider validation notices as junk mail or a 'scam' and disregard them. This then
causes the debtor to lose out on their right to timely dispute the debt or request
verification of the debt. This process helps to move the debt one more step down
the road to obtain default judgment.").
" See id.
82 See FTC WORKSHOP REPORT, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
83 Hepsen v. J.C. Christensen & Assocs., Inc., No. 8:07-CV-1935-T-EAJ, 2009
WL 3064865 at *4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2009), aff'd,. 383 F. App'x. 877 (11th Cir.
2010).
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III. DEBT COLLECTORS' ARGUMENTS
a. The "To Whom a Debt is Owed" Red Herring Defense
One argument that debt collectors commonly raise to support
their claimed creditor status is that they have actually purchased -
and are the legal owners of - the debt. In FTC v. Check Investors, the
debt collector, Check Investors, argued that owning the obligations
made it a creditor under the statute because the definition of creditor
includes "to whom a debt is owed." 84 This flawed argument,
however, fails to account for the rest of the language in the definition,
which excludes purchasers of defaulted debt from creditor status.ss
The court was quite blunt in clarifying the fallacy of Check
Investors' "To Whom a Debt is Owed" red herring defense:
[Appellants] claim further that because Check Investors is
owed the debt, it did not "receive[ ] an assignment or
transfer" of the NSF checks "solely for the purpose of'
collecting the debt for Telecheck. Thus, Appellants argue
that Check Investors satisfies the statutory definition of a
"creditor," and, therefore, they are not subject to the
provisions of the FDCPA. Although the argument is rather
clever, it is wrong. It would elevate form over substance
and weave a technical loophole into the fabric of the
FDCPA big enough to devour all of the protections
Congress intended in enacting that legislation. * * *
Nevertheless, pursuant to § 1692a, Congress has
unambiguously directed our focus to the time the debt was
acquired in determining whether one is acting as a creditor
or debt collector under the FDCPA.8 6
The court, therefore confirmed that the definition of creditor turns on
whether or not the debt was purchased after default, and not on "to
whom the debt is owed."
84 F.T.C. v. Check Investors, 502 F.3d 159, 159 (3d Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 569 (2008); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4).
815 U.S.C. 1692a(4) (2006) ("The term creditor . .. does not include any
person to the extent that he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default
solel for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another.").
CheckInvestors, 502 F.3d at 172-73.
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i. Example of Red Herring Defense #1: Hernandez v. Affiliated
Group8 7 - Creditor in Context of Validation Notice
Debt collectors also use the "To Whom a Debt is Owed" red
herring defense to claim that the statutory definition of creditor does
not apply in the context of the validation notice. Relying on the
modifier, "to whom the debt is owed," debt collectors argue that the
term 'creditor' in the validation notice requirement is different from
the statutory definition of 'creditor.' 8 8 They therefore claim that the
validation notice requirement only requires them to name the current
owner of the debt, even if that owner is a debt collector.
An example of this intentional misidentification by a debt
buyer, compounded by fuzzy logic and language from the Court is
found in Hernandez v. Affiliated Group.89 There, the defaulted debt
buyer (Genesis Financial Solutions) hired a debt collector (Affiliated
Group) to collect Hernandez's debt.90 Although the debt was sold by
the creditor (Smart Energy) after default, Affiliated sent a validation
notice naming only Genesis as the creditor. 91 The court, without
consulting the statute for the definition of creditor, held that
Affiliated was only "required to provide Hernandez with the name of
the creditor to whom the debt is owed."92 The court further added that
Affiliated need not name Smart Energy, the original creditor, because
the identity of the original creditor is only required when the
consumer requests it.9 3
In addition to deviating from governing law,94 the court's
reasoning defies a fundamental rule of statutory construction: if a
statute defines a term, that definition must be applied consistently
87 Hernandez v. Affiliated Group, Inc., No. 04CV4467, 2006 WL 83474, at *1
(E.D. N.Y. Jan. 12, 2006).
88 The validation notice requirement states that a validation notice must contain
"the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed." 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a)(2)
(emphasis added); see also id. § 1692a(4) ("The term creditor means any person
who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed. )
(emphasis added).
89 Hernandez, 2006 WL 83474, at *1.
90 See id.
91 Actually, Smart Energy first sold the debt to Peak Financial Performers, who
in turn sold the debt to Genesis Financial Solutions. Id.
92 Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
93 Id.
94 See Alibrandi v. Fin. Outsourcing Servs., Inc., 333 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir.
2003) (applying the rule that the classification of creditor depends on whether the
debt was in default when obtained).
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throughout the act.9 5 Moreover, "[w]hen a statute includes an explicit
definition, [courts] must follow that definition, even if it varies from
that term's ordinary meaning." 96 Therefore 'creditor,' as defined in
§ 1692a(4), applies uniformly throughout the statute, including the
validation notice provision. Regardless of whether the current
creditor is also the original creditor, the validation must name the
creditor, not the debt collector. 97
ii. Example of Red Herring Defense #2: Kimber v. Federal
Financial Corp. - Debt Collectors Collecting for
Themselves
In Kimber v. Federal Financial Corp., Federal Financial
Corp. ("FFC"), the debt collector that purchased after default,
similarly argued that the FDCPA does not apply to actual owners of
the debt. 99
FFC argued that when debt buyers permanently purchase
debts, they do not collect debts "for another" but rather for
themselves. Therefore, they claim, they do not fall in the "assignee
exception"100 to the definition of creditor, thus designating them as
creditors. However, the court rejected FFC's argument and held that
to interpret 'creditor' to include holders of defaulted debt "would be
to limit the [FDCPA] severely and to leave it open to easy evasion by
simply adopting a different form of contract."1
Instead, the court looked to the statutory definition of the
terms 'creditor' and 'debt collector' and decided that the "assignee
exception" relied on by FFC applies to "those persons who collect
assigned or transferred debts that .are already in default when
9 See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:7 (7th ed. 2007) ("It is commonly understood that
such definitions establish meaning where the terms appear in that same act, or in
the case of general interpretative statutes, the definitions extend to as much
legislation as the general act itself designates. As a rule, a definition which declares
what a term means is binding upon the court.").
96 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000).
97 See supra Part II.a.iv.
9 Kimber v. Fed. Fin. Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480 (M.D. Ala. 1987).
9 Id. at 1485.
100 Id. The "assignee exception to creditor" refers to a portion in the FDCPA
excluding assignees of debts from the definition of "creditor."; see also 15 U.S.C. §
1692a(4) (2006) ("[S]uch term [creditor] does not include any person to the extent
that he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for the purpose
of facilitating collection of such debt for another.").
1o' Kimber, 668 F. Supp. at 1485.
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assigned or transferred" and not only to temporary assignees.102
"Congress merely intended that the debts should have originally
belonged to another."' 03 All purchasers after default fall under the
assignee exception, and are thus debt collectors.
Well-reasoned opinions that track the statutory language have
held similarly - that ownership of the obligation does not determine
whether the owner is a creditor or a debt collector.104 Rather, "the
status of the debt at the time of assignment [i.e. pre vs. post default],
not whether the assignee collects debt for itself or others, is the
determinative factor in deciding whether the assignee is a debt
collector." 05
Tellingly, courts have further ruled that, even where debt
buyers do not actually collect debts themselves, but hire others to
collect for them, their post-default purchase of debts is sufficient to
make them debt collectors. 06
The reason that the distinction of status of creditor and debt
collector hinges upon the default date becomes apparent when
reviewing the legislative history of the FDCPA. The aim of the
FDCPA was to regulate only debt collectors, and not creditors,
because "unlike creditors, 'who generally are restrained by the desire
to protect their good will when collecting past due accounts,'
independent collectors are likely to have 'no future contact with the
consumer and often are unconcerned with the consumer's opinion of
them."'l
07
"The purchaser of an already-defaulted debt - like the debt
collector, and unlike the originator and servicer of a debt - has no
ongoing relationship with the debtor and, therefore, no incentive to
engender rood will by treating the debtor with honesty and
respect."' 0
b. Affirmative Defenses
In addition to the Red Herring defense, debt collectors also
102 id.
103 id
104 See supra Part II.
105 Centurion Capital Corp. v. Druce, 828 N.Y.S.2d 851, 853 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
2006).
106 See Ruth v. Triumph P'ships, 577 F.3d 790, 796 (7th Cir. 2009).
10 F.T.C. v. Check Investors, 502 F.3d 159, 173 (3d Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 569 (2008) (quoting S. REP. No. 95-382, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696).
108 Ruth, 577 F.3d at 797 (internal citations omitted).
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routinely rely on two affirmatives defenses provided by the FDCPA:
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") safe harbor defense and the
bona fide error defense.
i. FTC Safe Harbor Defense: Only Four Advisory Opinions
The FTC safe harbor defense of the FDCPA is as follows:
No provision of this section imposing any liability shall
apply to any act done or omitted - in good faith in
conformity with any advisory opinion of the Commission,
notwithstanding that after such act or omission has
occurred, such opinion is amended, rescinded, or
determined b judicial or other authority to be invalid for
any reason.
The FTC safe harbor defense only applies, to reliance on
official FTC advisory opinions. There have been only four advisory
opinions published to date discussing the FTC safe harbor defense,
and none of them addresses the issues related to identification of
creditors and debt collectors.' 10 Although some debt collectors have
attempted to broaden the scope of the FTC advisory opinion defense
by using -FTC's staff commentaries and informal opinion letters,
courts have been reluctant to grant them relief."' The FTC itself
confirmed that the commentaries are not formal trade regulations or
advisory opinions of the Commission, "and thus [are] not binding on
the Commission or the public."11 2 Therefore, the FTC safe harbor
defense will not provide much help to debt collectors, such as Harold,
who misidentify the creditor in the validation notice.
.o9 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(e) (2006).
110 See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Staff Opinion Letter, 2000 WL 34500216 (Mar.
31, 2000); see also Fed. Trade Comm'n, Staff Opinion Letter (Oct. 5, 2007),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/P064803fairdebt.pdf; Fed. Trade
Comm'n, Staff Opinion Letter (Mar. 19, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/03/PO84801fdcpa.pdf; Fed. Trade Comm'n, Staff
Opinion Letter (June. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.fic.gov/os/statutes/andersonbeatoletter.pdf.
"' See, e.g., Fox v. Citicorp Credit Servs., 15 F.3d 1507, 1513 (9th Cir. 1994)
(declining to adopt a position in an FTC commentary); Hulshizer v. Global Credit
Serv., 728 F.2d 1037, 1038 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (relying on an FTC staff
letter to a debt collector was not a valid FTC safe harbor defense.).
112 Federal Staff Commentary on the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 53
Fed. Reg. 50097, 50101 (1988).
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ii. Bona Fide Error Defense: Mistakes of Law are not Included
The bona fide error defense of the FDCPA is as follows:
A debt collector may not be held liable in any action
brought under this title if the debt collector shows by a
preponderance of evidence that the violation was not inten-
tional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding
the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid
any such error.'
Generally, the bona fide error defense covers clerical errors
occurring even while proper reasonable preventative measures are in
place. In Smith v. Transworld Systems, the court found that a clerical
error, resulting in a second collection letter sent after receiving the
debtor's cease and desist letter,114 was covered by the bona fide error
defense because the error occurred even while proper preventative
measures were in place."1 5
By contrast, in Reichert v. National Credit Systems, the court
held that mere reliance on the creditor who had provided accurate
information in the past was not enough for a bona fide error defense
because the debt collector did not show any procedures in place to
prevent such errors. 116 Reichert held that even a reasonable reliance
on a third party must be made "on the basis of procedures maintained
to avoid mistakes" to be allowed the bona fide error defense.1 17
113 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2006). Some courts have followed Clark 2 in
interpreting this provision to mean nothing more than a reasonable reliance
requirement. Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162,
1177 (9th Cir. 2006); see, e.g., Goray v. Unifund CCR Partners, No. 06-00214
HG/LEK, 2007 WL 4260017, at *9 (D. Haw. 2007) (finding reasonable reliance on
the amount of debt provided by the creditor); Hepsen v. Resurgent Capital Servs.,
Inc., 383 F. App'x. 877, 883 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that the debtor unreasonably
relied on the identity of the creditor, because the debt collector should have known
who the creditor was from prior dealings).
114 Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1031 (6th Cir. 1992).
Sending a collection letter after receiving a cease and desist letter from a debtor is
normally a violation of sections 1692c(c) and 1692g(b) of the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692c(c), 1692g(b) (2006) (stating that, with a few limited exceptions, a debt
collector may not contact a debtor who has sent a cease and desist letter to the debt
collector).
115 Smith, 953 F.2d at 1031.
116 Reichert v. Nat'l Credit Sys., Inc., 531 F.3d 1002, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 2008).
117 Id. at 1007; see also Fox v. Citicorp Credit Serv., 15 F.3d 1507, 1514 (9th
Cir. 1994) ("In the absence of any evidence supporting the existence of 'reasonable
preventative procedures,' an essential element of the bona fide error exception,
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As an affirmative defense, the burden of proof will be on
Harold to show by preponderance that his error was unintentional,
and could not have been prevented by reasonable preventative
procedures that were already in place." 8 For Harold, this is a very
high burden.
In Jerman v. Carlisle, the Supreme Court ruled that the bona
fide error defense does not apply to incorrect legal interpretations.119
The Court applied the reasoning from Baker v. G. C. Services12 0 - that
since the language of the bona fide error defense of the FDCPA is
identical to that of the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"),121 it should be
interpreted like TILA's provision, to exclude legal errors. 122 The
Court also rejected the argument in Johnson v. Riddle that the
additional language in TILA listing the legal error exclusions gives
the FDCPA's bona fide error defense a more expansive scope.123
Citicorp is not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of the affirmative
defense.").
1 See Turner v. JVDB & Assoc., 330 F.3d 991, 996-97 (7th Cirn 2003); see
also Fox, 15 F. 3d at 1514.
119 Jerman v. Carlisle, Mcnellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605,
1624 (2010).
120 Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1982).
121 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2006).
122.Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1616. Previously, courts were split on the issue of
whether the bona fide error defense applies to mistakes of law. See Johnson v.
Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1121 & n.14 (10th Cir. 2002) ("Outside this circuit, federal
courts have split on the issue, with a majority concluding that the defense is limited
to clerical errors and cannot protect mistakes of law, but a growing minority of
courts reaching the contrary conclusion"). Compare Picht v. Jon R. Hawks, Ltd.,
236 F.3d 446, 451 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that bona fide error defense does not
apply to mistakes of law), and Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc., 886 F.2d
22, 27 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding the same), and Baker, 677 F.2d at 779 (holding that
the defense did not apply to mistakes of law because the same provision in TILA
has been unanimously held not to apply to mistakes of law), with Jenkins v. Heintz,
124 F.3d 824, 832 & n. 7, 833 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a bona fide error
defense does apply to mistakes of law), and Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107,
1122-23 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that since TILA explicitly excludes legal errors
from bona fide error defense, and the FDCPA does not mention any such exclusion,
FDCPA's bona fide error defense should cover legal errors).
123 Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1617. The Court listed several reasons why the
additional language in TILA does not expand the scope in FDCPA. First, the
additional language in TILA may simply be an "inten[t] to codify existing judicial
interpretations to remove any potential doubts." Id at 1617-18. Second, Congress
enacted many other laws with similar bona fide error provisions, none of which
expressly includes mistakes of law. Id. at 1618. Although Congress amended the
FDCPA several times without expressly restricting the bona fide error defense (as
done with TILA), this does not suggest that errors of law should be included. Id.
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Rather, the Court drew from the FDCPA's language that debt
collectors must "maintain procedures reasonably adopted to avoid
such error" to mean that such procedures are meant to avoid clerical
and factual mistakes rather than legal mistakes.124 Further, the Court
found that to interpret the bona fide error defense to include legal
errors would be to render the FTC safe harbor defense superfluous,
since le al errors are already covered by the FTC safe harbor
defense. In short, the "common maxim, familiar to all minds, that
ignorance of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or
criminally" rings true for the FDCPA. 126
Clearly, the debt collector who fails to properly identify the
creditor on a validation notice - or verify with the creditor upon
timely debtor demand - cannot escape liability under the FDCPA by
claiming any bona fide error in misinterpreting the correct legal
definitions.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
By intentionally misidentifying themselves as creditors in
validation notices, debt collectors are ignoring the law, defying
legislative intent, and violating debtors' rights. For financial gain,
unscrupulous debt collectors continue to exploit the, confusion they
create, and therefore compete unfairly with lawful debt collectors.1
Fortunately, the solution is simple. In fact, the solution is so simple
that, like the forest for the trees, we often miss it. Perhaps that is why
these unlawful debt collectors produce a smokescreen of
misidentification and faulty reasoning. To find our way through the
124 Id. at 1614-15 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c)).
125 Id. at 1615 ("Debt collectors would rarely need to 'consult the FTC if
§1692k(c) were read to offer immunity for good faith reliance on advice from
private counsel."); see also supra Part III.b.i..
126 Id. at 1611 (quoting Barlow v. U.S., 7 Pet. 404, 411, 8 L.Ed. 728 (1833)).
127 The FTC attempts to correct these injustices by recommending amendments
to the FDCPA. In its 2005 Annual Report, the FTC made several recommendations
to amend or clarify the FDCPA. FED.TRADE COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 2005: FAIR
DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT (2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/fdcpa05/050729fdcparpt.pdf. FTC renewed this
recommendation for several subsequent years, but Congress has never accepted it.
See FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 2006: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION
PRACTICES ACT 13 (2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/04/PO648042006FDCPAReport.pdf; FTC WORKSHOP
REPORT, supra note 9, at 28; FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 2010: FAIR
DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 22 (2010), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/04/Pl04802fdcpa2010annrpt.pdf
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fog of deceit, we must be accurate and consistent in applying the
statutory definitions of creditor and debt collector.
Consistency in interpreting and applying debt collection laws
will benefit debtors while avoiding the significant judicial
inefficiencies regarding Zombie Debt Collections. Strict adherence to
clear statutory definitions of creditor and debt collector will promote
clarity in communications among parties to a debt, their lawyers, and
the court. Then, debtors will be able to identify the Zombie Debts and
make a timely dispute. Common mistakes will be avoided. Such
consistency will allow the courts and enforcement agencies to easily
identify true violations, thus providing better protection not only for
ethical debt collectors but also, and especially, for consumers. 128
Sadly, in our current struggling economy, more people are
falling into greater consumer debt. 29 Consequently, more of these
128 Because the definition of creditor in the FDCPA is clear on its face, proper
enforcement is all that is necessary. Each consumer who receives a validation
notice that fails to name the correct creditor has the right to seek damages up to
$1,000 without having to show any actual damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2). The
FDCPA has also provided a right to receive court costs and reasonable attorney's
fees if the consumer prevails. Id. at 1692k(a)(3). Since the FDCPA is a strict
liability statute, the faulty validation notice alone may be sufficient evidence to
prevail at trial. In fact, many consumer lawyers have reported stunning results
when suing debt collectors, with one lawyer in Fort Worth, Texas claiming to have
lost only four cases out of 5,000 that he has brought against debt collectors. David
Segal, Debt Collectors Face a Hazard: Writer's Cramp, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2010,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/01/business/0ldebt.html. These
faulty validation notices may be subject to mass tort liability under class action or
states' Unfair and Deceptive Practices ("UDAP") statutes. In Oregon, for example,
each violation may result in a fine of $25,000. OR. REV. STAT. § 646.642(c) (2009)
("In any suit brought under ORS 646.632 (Enjoining unlawful trade practices), if
the court finds that a person is willfully using or has willfully used a method, act or
practice declared unlawful by ORS 646.607 (Unlawful business, trade practices) or
646.608 (Additional unlawful business, trade practices), the prosecuting attorney,
upon petition to the court, may recover, on behalf of the state, a civil penalty to be
set b the court of not exceeding $25,000 per violation.").
See FTC WORKSHOP REPORT, supra note 9, at 11-12 ("Since the enactment
of the FDCPA, consumer debt has risen dramatically. More and more Americans
incur greater levels of debt, much of it attributable to mortgage debt and consumer
debt. Between 1985 and 2007, outstanding household debt in the United States
increased from approximately 60% of annual, disposable income to more than
125%, a jump due mostly to increased mortgage debt. One workshop presenter
noted that in the mid-1980s, it would have taken the average household seven
months of after-tax income to pay off its household debt. As of 2007, however, an
average household would have needed fifteen months of after-tax income to pay off
its household debt. While household-debt-to-income ratios of consumers have
nearly doubled, lower interest rates and longer repayment terms have enabled many
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people are coming into frequent contact with an ever-expanding
group of debt collectors. These consumers are people like Debbie
whose stress under such financial burdens is considerable. However,
the solution is simple and readily attainable. Courts, attorneys, and
debt collectors alike need to clearly and consistently apply the
existing statutory definitions of creditor and debt collector in the
FDCPA.
consumers to remain current on their debts.") (internal citations omitted).
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Figure 1
Number of Complaints FTC Received about Debt Collectors
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